44mm Midnight Planétarium from Van Cleef & Arpel’s Poetic Astronomy series
In addition to telling time by way of a shooting star that rotates along the outmost area of the face, the watch more prominently features an accurate rotation and representation of the Earth and the five other planets visible from here around the sun—Mercury in 88 days, Venus in 224, Earth in a year, Mars in 687 days, Jupiter in 12 years and Saturn in 29. It’s a very complex watch and a true display of supreme watchmaking. But as complicated as the piece is—with 396 parts to the movement—it’s also beautiful.
…On top of the already extravagant design, one of the more standout features is the ability to set any of the 365 days in the year as a “lucky star,” an additional element in this magical cosmos. When your day arrives the lucky star is located just above the Earth on the dial.
…The mechanical movement with an automatic winding unit was developed in two parts: An internal movement (made in-house) is partnered with a module made specifically for Van Cleef & Arpels by boutique designer Christiaan van der Klaauw, who specializes in astronomic design. The Van Cleef team pushed van der Klaauw to develop something using the brand’s DNA.
Lieutenant Brannigan: What brings all these senior delinquents together?
Nathan Detroit: They got lonely. How am I supposed to know?
Lieutenant Brannigan: And why are they all wearing red carnations?
Nathan Detroit: They are also all wearing pants.
How (Some) Criminals are Made, Theodore Y. Blumoff
The Kantian premise. Contemporary efforts to poke holes in the Kantian myth of the good will began in 1976 with an essay by Bernard Williams. Williams made a frontal challenge on the Kantian notion that there is a form of moral value free from contingencies of all kinds.
…Williams was having none of it and neither was Thomas Nagel, who responded to, and in important ways disagreed with Williams’ original position. Nevertheless, in important ways Nagel’s understanding of moral luck went beyond Williams’ to challenge the Kantian notion of the good will. The problem with Kant’s position, as Nagel points out, is that whatever conduct one undertakes, whether one fulfill one’s goals or fail to fulfill them, it is in fact affected by factors outside the actor’s control. Whenever a substantial part of the reasons for and outcome of all that one seeks to accomplish is influenced by factors beyond one’s control, yet we continue to assess blameworthiness based on the actor’s effects, we are dealing with moral luck.